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I. INTRODUCTION

Dolphin, among the world's most intelligent mammals, are
being decimated by tuna fishermen. Since the 1960s, the dolphin
population has decreased by 80%.' Most dolphin are taken,2
killed, or seriously injured, by the fishing nets of foreign tuna
fishing fleets. 3 In 1987, the United States tuna fleet killed 13,992
dolphins, while the foreign fleets4 killed over 100,000 dolphins5

in the Eastern Tropical Pacific.6 At least two subspecies have
fallen below their optimum sustainable population thus threatening
the species' existence.7

1. Implementation of the Marine Mammal ProtectionAct Amendments: Hearings on H.R
2926 and H.R 2948 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the
Environmen4 Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1989)

[hereinafter MMPA Hearings] (statement of Rep. Schneider) ("It has been estimated that since the
1960s six million dolphins,- or roughly 80% of the dolphin population, "have been killed by both
foreign and domestic tuna fleets.").
2. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)
[hereinafter MMPA] ("Take" means to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt,
capture, or kill).
3. MMPA Hearings, supra note 1, at 201 (statement of Christopher Croft, Greenpeace
representative). "'From 1977 to 1988, the U.S. fleet dwindled from over 100 boats to 23 boats, as the
foreign fleet ballooned to more than 70 boats from fewer than 10. Today, foreign vessels comprise
68% of the eastern Pacific fleet and account for 85% of the dolphin mortalities." Id.
4. "Foreign" and "international" both refer to the tuna fishing operations of Ecuador,
Mexico, Panama, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. 54 Fed. Reg. 7933 (1989).
5. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, S. REP. No. 592, 100th Cong. 2d.
Sess. 6 [hereinafter MMPA Amendments]. In 1989, purse seine fishing killed 96,979 dolphins, a23%
increase from 1988. The American kill of dolphin in 1989 was 12,643, a 36% decrease. But in 1989,
the foreign rate increased 42% to 84,364 dolphins killed. MacLean, EnvironmentalistsSeek Foreign
Tuna Embargo to Halt Dolphin Kill, U. Press Int'l, Aug. 20, 1990, § Regional News (BC cycle).
6. 53 Fed. Reg. 39,743 (1988) ("The [Eastern Tropical Pacific] is the Pacific Ocean area
bounded by 40* north latitude, 40* south latitude, 160" west longitude, and the coasts of North,
Central and South America.").
7. MMPA,supranote 2, § 1362(8). See Statement of: American Cetacean Society, American
Humane Society, Animal Protection Institute of America, California Marine Mammal Center, Center
for Environmental Education, Defenders of Wildlife, Earth Island Institute, Friends of the Earth,
Greenpeace U.S.A., The Humane Society of the United States, International Wildlife Coalition,
Marine Mammal Fund, National Audubon Society, Northwind Undersea Institute, The Oceanic
Society, Society for Animal Protective Legislation, and The Whale Center before the National Ocean
Policy Study of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on the Reauthorization
ofthe Marine Mammal Protection Act 10 (1988) [hereinafter Greenpeace Statement] (available from
Greenpeace in San Francisco, California) (statement of Lesley Sheele, Greenpeace Spokesperson) ("A
stock which has been reduced below its optimum sustainable population (OSP), interpreted at 60%
of its original size, is considered 'depleted'.... Currently, two stocks, the eastern spinner and coastal
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The dolphin and tuna have a symbiotic relationship.8 Dolphin
swim in the upper levels of the ocean where they are visible as
they break the surface of the water to breathe. Tuna swim below
the dolphins.9 Fishing fleets follow the visible dolphin herds in
order to locate schools of tuna swimming below. The fishing
vessels then set their nets on the dolphins in order to catch the
tuna. The nets often drown or seriously injure the dolphin.'"
In response to this growing problem, the U.S. Congress enacted
the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 [hereinafter MMPA or
the Act]." The U.S. Congress determined that dolphin are
resources of great international significance.12 Dolphins have
aesthetic, recreational and economic value.13 Because dolphin are
a migratory species, they affect the balance of marine ecosystems
in a manner which is important to other animals and animal
products. 14 A major purpose of the Act is to protect dolphins and
other marine mammals from the dangers of commercial tuna
fishing operations. 5

spotted dolphin, have been so reduced by tuna fishing operations they have been designated as
depleted.").
8. MMPA Amendments, supra note 5, at 6 (Although termed "symbiotic," the dolphin and
tuna's close association is not necessarily for the benefit of each other). See Beyette, Catch-22;Must
a Thriving San DiegoFishing Community Die So More PacificDolphinMay Live?, L.A. Times, May
1, 1990, § View, at 1, col. 2 (discussing the dolphin's symbiotic relationship with tuna).
9.
L

10.

Id

11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
12. MMPA, supra note 2, § 1361(6). See Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission,
Summary Minutes of the 48th Meeting, September 17-20 1990, San Jos;, Costa Rica, (statement of
Dr. Joseph) ("Because the fleets of many nations fish for tunas in association with dolphin, and
because more than twice as many dolphins are caught beyond the 200-mile limit as inside it, the
problem was international.").
13. MMPA, supra note 2, § 1361(6).
is the sense of the Congress that [dolphin] should be protected and encouraged
14. Id -[I]t
to develop to the greatest extent feasible commensurate with sound policies of resource management
and that the primary objective of their management should be to maintain the health and stability of
the marine ecosystem." Id.
15. MMPA Amendments, supra note 5, at 1-3 (The MMPA was enacted in 1972 for the
purpose of ensuring that marine mammals are maintained at healthy levels. In order to minimize the
impact of commercial fishing on populations of marine mammals, the Act directed the Secretary of
Commerce to establish a permit system and issue regulations which would ensure that the techniques
and equipment used by the fishermen would produce the least practicable hazard to marine
mammals).
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The MMPA significantly impacts the U.S. tuna fishing fleets
[hereinafter domestic fleets] by reducing the number of dolphins
taken by domestic fleets. 6 Environmental organizations 7 argue
that, although U.S. fleets comply with the MMPA, too many
dolphins are killed, and stricter provisions" are necessary to
maintain optimum sustainable populations.' 9 Despite this claim,
the U.S. Congress is primarily concerned with the foreign fleets
which continuously take large numbers of dolphins from the
Eastern Tropical Pacific.2" This concern is sufficiently supported
by statistics. In 1989, the international fleet's total dolphin

16. Id. The Committee Report discussed the success of the Act in the U.S. by reducing the
dolphin mortality from 369,000 in 1972 to 18,573 in 1980. IL
17. See Greenpeace Statement, supranote 7, at 5 (asserting that the dolphin mortality problem
which was recognized a decade ago, still has not been resolved).
18. Telephone interview with Amy Hollerant, Director of Dolphin Project, Greenpeace Action,
in San Francisco (January 14, 1991). Ms. Hollerant recommended that observers be placed on board
100% of the foreign tuna vessels and that a new enforcement agency replace the Fisheries Service.
She claimed that the Fisheries Service does not effectively enforce the Act because, among many
reasons, the Fisheries Service has strong ties with the tuna industry. That is, the Fisheries Service is
unwilling to limit the amount of tuna imported to the U.S. because the decreased supply will raise
prices. Id.
19. H.R. REP. No. 970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 6154,6156. The Committee Report also discussed the issue of whether the goal of the
Act was being fulfilled because the incidental kill of porpoise had not been reduced to insignificant
levels approaching zero. The tuna industry contends that by using the best technology feasible to
reduce incidental porpoise mortality, the industry was meeting the mandate of the Act. Il See
Greenpeace Statement, supra note 7, at 16-17 ("The bottom line remains the number of dolphins
actually killed and the impact of the fishery on specific stocks. By this measure, conditions have not
improved for over a decade.... The Congress has stated that the immediate goal of the Act is that
commercial fishing operations reduce kill levels of marine mammals to levels approaching a zero
mortality rate. It is our opinion that the intentional take of massive numbers of dolphins in the tuna
fishery is inconsistent with such a goal. Sixteen years after the Act was passed it is time for the
practice of setting on dolphins to be stopped."). The phrase "setting on dolphins" describes fishing
vessels that encircle the dolphins with nets to catch tuna. EarthIsland, infra note 20, 746 F. Supp.
at 967.
20. MMPA Amendments, supra note 5, at 7 ("While the U.S. industry has made dramatic
improvements since the enactment of the MMPA, unregulated tuna fleets of foreign nations now
present a far more serious source of porpoise mortality."). See Reply to Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7, Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) (No. C-88-1380-TEH), aft'd, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Earth Island].
The Tuna Commission disseminated a report at its 1990 meeting stating that the total foreign kill of
dolphin was 19.3% higher in 1989 than the previous year. The aggregate foreign kill of dolphin in
1989 exceeded the 2.0 times U.S. kill rate comparability requirement in 1989. Id.
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mortality was 84,279.21 This is a dramatic increase from 1988
levels.' Additionally, preliminary figures for 1990 show little
change from 1989.'

Under the Act, excessive dolphin mortality rates result in
excluding foreign fisheries from exporting tuna to the U.S. As a
major consumer of canned tuna,2 4 the U.S. greatly influences the

methods of tuna fishing by banning tuna exports of foreign fleets
with excessive dolphin mortality rates. International fisheries not
conforming with the MMPA are prohibited from exporting tuna to
the U.S. Theoretically, without access to a major tuna market the
noncomplying foreign fisheries are forced to comply with the
provisions of the Act in order to regain access to the U.S.
market.' Unfortunately, due to ineffective enforcement of the Act

the foreign fisheries are not denied access to the U.S. market
despite their unreasonable dolphin mortality rate.
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the MMPA and
analyze ways to resolve two of its weaknesses. These weaknesses
are the inadequate observer coverage rate on the foreign fleet and
the ineffective enforcement of the Act on the international level.
Part II examines the MMPA and its effect on domestic and foreign
tuna fishing operations. Part 111 explores the weaknesses of the Act.

21. Declaration of David C. Phillips in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 2, Earth Island,supra note 20.
22. Id. "At the June 1990 conference, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission released
documents which indicated that mortality rose by 22.9% when calculated on a mortality per set ratio,
and 19.3% when calculated on a mortality per ton ratio." Id.
23. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Considerations for an International Dolphin
Conservation and/or Management Program forthe Eastern Pacific Ocean, BP1-90B]2 (Sept. 12,1990)
(unpublished manuscript for the Tuna Commission meeting on September 17-18, 1990) [hereinafter
Background Paper] ("So far in 1990 the patterns of fishing do not appear to have changed much,
compared to 1989").
24. Manning, The Net Effect on Dolphin, More Foreign Fishing Boats Pose a Risk, USA
Today, August 6, 1990, § Life, at 4, col. 1 (The U.S. consumes 40% of the world's canned tuna. This
market could force foreign fisheries to stop excessive killing of dolphins). See Peckham, NOAA's
TUNA NEWSLErrER, Feb. 1989, 8-9 (The U.S. consumed over 50% of all canned tuna produced in
the world between 1986 and 1988).
25. Manning, supra note 24, at 4 (statement by Brenda Killian, head of the Dolphin Project
for Earth Island Institute) (describing the international situation) ("The buying power of the U.S.
market... is likely to force foreign fishers to stop killing dolphins."). "Two companies in Italy and
the French canners' association have vowed to go dolphin-safe.... The Ecuadorian tuna fleet have
vowed to go dolphin-safe .... We've got to keep the pressure on, to encourage other countes." Id.
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Part IV proposes two amendments to the Act. If enacted, these
amendments would increase observer coverage rates and create a
new enforcement agency to better accomplish the original goal of
the MMPA: reducing dolphin mortality.26

II. THE MARINE MAMMAL PROTECnTON ACT
The purpose of the Act is to reduce to insignificant levels27
the number of marine mammals incidentally killed during
commercial fishing operations.28 To achieve this goal, the Act
authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to regulate commercial tuna
operations by limiting the number of dolphins taken while
29

fishing.

A. United States Standards
To enforce the Act's provisions in the United States, a threemember Marine Mammal Commission (MMC) monitors the
implementation of the Act through a permit system.30 This permit
system ensures that vessels use the safest equipment practicable
and that dolphin mortality rates are within the provisions of the

26. MMPA, supranote 2, § 1371(a)(2) ("In any event it shall be the immediate goal that the
incidental kill or incidental serious injury of marine mammals permitted in the course of commercial
fishing operations be reduced to insignificant levels approaching a zero mortality and serious injury
rate.").

27. Id. (The Act also notes that "this goal shall be satisfied in the case of the incidental taking
of marine mammals in the course of purse seine fishing for yellowfin tuna by a continuation of the
application of the best marine mammal safety techniques and equipment that are economically and
technologically practicable.").

28.

"Incidental" is generally defined as "occurring merely by chance or without intention or

calculation." WEBsTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OP TE ENGuSH LANGUAGE

1142 (unabr. ed. 1981). However, Greenpeace disagrees: "Unlike other fisheries with marine
mammal kills, these dolphins are not passively taken when they encounter fishing gear. Rather,..
.[iQt is a purposeful hunting, harassment, capture and, in some cases, killing of marine mammals."
Greenpeace Statement, supra note 7, at 17.

29.
30.
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MMPA.31 If a vessel meets the permit standards, the MMC grants
the vessel a permit thereby allowing the vessel to take dolphins in
the course of its fishing operations.32
Observers from the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission 33 [hereinafter Tuna Commission] provide the
information necessary to determine whether a permit is granted. 34
Observers on the fishing vessels monitor dolphin mortality during
tuna fishing and record data on fishing practices. 35 The MMC
uses this data to determine whether permit standards are met. For
example, the data is used to determine if the quota on dolphin
mortality of 20,500 dolphins per season is followed. 6 A recent
amendment to the MMPA requires a 100% observer coverage rate
on all domestic fleets.37 Such coverage ensures accurate data.38
B. Domestic Compliance with the Act
The domestic fishing fleets presently comply with the
provisions of the MMPA.39 Since January 1, 1989, the domestic
fleets have maintained a 100% observer coverage rate. 4° In 1989,

31. Id. at 3. "The Act directed the Secretary of Commerce to establish a permit system and
issue regulations which would ensure that the techniques and equipment used by fishermen would
produce the least practicable hazard to marine mammals." Id."The National Marine Fisheries
Service, on behalf of the Secretary, issues 'general permits' for the take of relatively large numbers
of marine mammals by U.S. and foreign fishermen.... The Secretary of Commerce [is] to obtain
reasonable proof from foreign governments in order to make a finding that foreign commercial
fishing techniques were not resulting in kills or injuries in excess of U.S. standards." ICE
32. MMPA, supra note 2, §§ 1372-74 (discussing permit system).
33. The Tuna Commission is an international scientific body funded by the tuna industry
which monitors tuna fisheries in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean.
34. 54 Fed. Reg. 20,171 (1989).
35. 1&d
36. 54 Fed. Reg. 20,172 (1989) (A 1980 MMPA amendment imposes a ceiling on dolphin
mortality of 20,500 dolphins per season).
37. 54 Fed. Reg. 20,171 (1989) (100% observer coverage is mandatory unless, for reasons
beyond the control of the Secretary of Commerce, an observer is not available for such purpose).
38. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,919 (1989).
39. MMPA Hearings,supra note 1, at 11 (statement of Mr. Fullerton, Director of National
Marine Fisheries Service). See MMPA Reauthorization, infra note 52, at 2 (statement of Sen. Kerry)
("I think that our U.S. fleet should be applauded for their initial efforts to decrease the mortality of
porpoises. In the past decade, the industry has reduced the killing from hundreds of thousands per
year down to about 13,000 a year. And this year's level is expected to go down to perhaps 10,000.").
40. MMPA Hearings,supra note 1, at 11 (statement of Mr. Fullerton).
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with 70% of the year gone, the projected U.S. dolphin mortality
rate was 30% under quota.41 Thus, domestic fleets abide by the
provisions of the Act thereby decreasing dolphin mortality.
C. Foreign Standards Under the MMPA
International enforcement of the Act is similar to domestic
enforcement of the Act. As in the United States, the Tuna
Commission observers provide data regarding the fishing practices
of the foreign fleet. The National Marine Fisheries Service42
[hereinafter Fisheries Service] assimilates the data and uses it to
enforce the Act internationally.43 The Fisheries Service compares
Tuna Commission observations of international dolphin mortality
with U.S. data to determine if the foreign fisheries comply with the
MMPA. 44 If a foreign fishery's kill data exceeds the U.S. rates,
that foreign fishery is denied access to the U.S. tuna market.45
In addition, the 1984 and 1988 amendments to the Act extend
the permit system to encompass foreign fisheries seeking to export
tuna products to the U.S. 46 In order to export tuna products to the

41. Id. at 28 (statement of August Felando, American Tunaboat Association President).
42. The National Marine Fisheries Service is a U.S. agency, in the Department of Commerce,
in charge of the international enforcement of the Act.
43. MMPA, supra note 2, §§ 1373, 1382.
44. 54 Fed. Reg. 20,172 (1989) ("The primary duties of observers in the international program
is to monitor and record the number of dolphin deaths by species/stocks during each trip. This data
is used by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission to estimate the total dolphin mortality for
the major species/stock for the entire international fleet on an annual basis.").
45. MMPA, supra note 2, § 1371(a)(2); 54 Fed. Reg. 7933 (1989) ("[I]n order to import
yellowf'm tuna into the United States, any nation which has purse seine vessels of 400 tons carrying
capacity or greater operating in the [Eastern Tropical Pacific] must supply documentary evidence that
it has a regulatory program governing the incidental taking of marine mammals... in the tuna
fishery and a resultant mortality rate of marine mammals which are comparable to that of the United
States.").
46. 54 Fed. Reg. 50,764 (1989). The Fisheries Service promulgated an interim rule to
implement the MMPA Amendments of 1988, concerning the importation of yellowfin tuna caught
by purse seining in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. 54 Fed. Reg. 9438 (1989). Under this rule, to import
yellowfin tuna into the United States during 1990, any nation which has purse seine vessels greater
than 400 tons carrying capacity operating in the Eastern Tropical Pacific must supply documentary
evidence that it has a regulatory program governing the incidental taking of marine mammals in the
tuna fishery comparable in most respects to that of the United States. Id.
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U.S., a foreign nation's fishing fleets must apply fishing practices
that are comparable to U.S. practices. 47
The Fisheries Service annually employs a two-part test to
determine whether to grant, or to extend, a finding of comparability
in order to issue a permit to foreign fleets.4 ' First, a foreign fleet
must have a regulatory program to protect mammals comparable to
the U.S. program. 49 The effectiveness of each foreign fleet's
regulatory program is determined by its annual marine mammal kill
rate. 50 Second, to qualify for tuna exportation to the U.S., each
foreign fleet must demonstrate, through reliable and verifiable data,
that its average annual rate of incidental mortality is comparable to
the rate achieved by the U.S. fleets.51
If a foreign fleet's dolphin mortality rate is not comparable to
the U.S. mortality rate, the foreign vessel has violated the MMPA.
Consequently, the foreign fleet may not export tuna to the U.S.
However, the MMPA is only effective if violations of the Act are
detected and properly enforced.52 Unfortunately many foreign

47. See 54 Fed. Reg. 9443-46 (1989) (providing a detailed explanation of the comparability
test). A foreign nation has standards comparable to the U.S. standards if it meets the following
requirements: "-Vlithas adopted a regulatory program containing the same prohibitions applicable to
U.S. vessels, within 180 days after the U.S. has imposed such restriction on its vessels; that the
average kill rate of its fleet is no more than two times the U.S. rate during the same period of time
by the end of 1989 and no more than 1.25 [times] the U.S. rate by the end of 1990; the percentage
of eastern spinners and coastal spotted dolphin does not exceed 16 percent and 2 percent respectively
of its total number of marine mammals taken in any year, [and] its fishing operations are monitored,
to the same degree as U.S. vessels, by an observer program of [the Tuna Commission] or an
equivalent international program." Id.
48. 54 Fed. Reg. 9442 (1989). The two-part test applies only to vessels of greater than 400
tons carrying capacity that purse seines for tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. This vessel size is
consistent with the U.S. experience that smaller vessels cannot effectively set, and do not set, on
marine mammals. Id.
49. 54 Fed. Reg. 9442 (1989). "The annual evaluation of the regulatory program will consider
the comparability of laws, regulations, guidelines, the observer program, and the enforcement program
which govern the vessel operators and the gear and techniques they must use to prevent or minimize
the number of marine mammals killed and seriously injured when purse seining for yellowfin tuna."
Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Hearings Before the National Ocean Policy Study of the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportationon the Reauthorizationof the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1988) [hereinafter MMPA Reauthorization] (statement of Mr. LaBudde and Mr.
Phillips of the Earth Island Institute) ("[B]oth Mexican and U.S. observers can attest to the
falsification of data concerning the numbers of dolphins killed.").
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fleets continue to violate the Act. Moreover, the Fisheries Service
is aware of the violations yet it fails to adequately sanction the
foreign fleets.53
1. Foreign Noncompliance with the Act
In contrast to the domestic fleets, the MMPA is ineffective in
regulating the dolphin mortality rates of the foreign fleets. Foreign
tuna fishermen continue to kill large numbers of dolphins. For
example, as of 1987 foreign vessels tuna fishing in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific slaughtered over 100,000 dolphins annually.54
Although the foreign fleets in this area are only twice the size of
the U.S. fleet, their estimated dolphin mortality rates are
approximately four times as high.55 The foreign fleets continue to
violate the Act's provisions despite their understanding of the
56
consequences of failing to meet the requirements of the MMPA.
High dolphin mortality among the foreign fleets is directly
linked to the Fisheries Service's ineffective enforcement of the Act
internationally. 57 "The problem is not with [the U.S.] tuna
industry. The problem is with the foreign fishermen, who take four
times more porpoises than our industry does... And even equally
as bad, our government has not done anything about it." 58 To
attain the goal of reducing dolphin mortality, enforcement must be
effective internationally as well as domestically.

53.

Id. (statement of Sen. Breaux).

54. MMFA Amendments, supra note 5, at 7. Foreign vessels caught 60% of the tuna and
killed 80% of the dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. Id.
55. See MMPA Hearings,supra note 1 (statement of Mr. Croft) (noting that the size of the
U.S. fleet has decreased, and that the foreign fleets' mortality rates have increased).

56.

MMPA Hearings, supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Mr. Fullerton) ("For the most part,

the tuna industries of [foreign] nations are keenly aware of the consequences [of denied tuna exports
to the U.S. due to the failure] to meet the MMPA requirements but have had difficulty in getting their

governments to recognize the requirements of the law.").
57.

134 CONG. REc. H8243 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1988) (statement of Rep. Jones) ("It is

important to remember that it is the greatly increased mortality caused by foreign tuna boats which
is responsible for most of the porpoise deaths.").
58. MMPA Reauthorization,supra note 52, at 156 (statement of Sen. Breaux).
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2. U.S. Reaction to ForeignNoncompliance
In an attempt to ensure foreign fleets are responsible in their
tuna fishing practices,59 Congress passed a provision in 1984
mandating that nations exporting tuna to the U.S. have an adequate
marine mammal protection program." In addition, the 1988
Amendments to the MMPA require the foreign fleets to lower the
number of dolphins killed to an average incidental take rate
comparable to the take rate of the U.S. fleet.6' Congress intended
these measures to aid in the international reduction of dolphin
mortality.
However, such modifications to the Act are ineffective. Foreign
fleets continue to kill an unacceptable number of dolphins.
Although frustration exists within the foreign fisheries because the
U.S. unilaterally imposed the Act, the foreign fisheries recognize
the need to reduce dolphin mortality.62 If the Fisheries Service
properly enforced the Act, the provisions would effectively reduce
foreign dolphin mortality.
Im. PROBLEMS wrr

THE MMPA

The MMPA's success in regulating the U.S. dolphin mortality
rate is not duplicated by the foreign fleets. Excessive international
dolphin mortality is largely a result of the Fisheries Service's
ineffective enforcement of the Act's provisions. 63 Illustrative of
this point is the Fisheries Service's faulty enforcement of the
fishing practices of the Mexican fleet.

59.
60.
61.

Id.

134 CONG. REc. S 16,345 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kerry).

62.

MMPA Hearings, supra note 1,at 12 (statement of Mr. Fullerton).

Id. See supra note 47 (defining a comparable take rate).

63. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (noting that the Fisheries Service does not
sanction known violations of the Act).

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 4
A. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher:"
Ineffective MMPA Enforcement

an Example of

The issue in Earth Island was whether the Fisheries Service
may use less than one year of dolphin-kill data to determine
whether Mexico is complying with the MMPA. On August 28,
1990, in response to an action initiated by Earth Island Institute and
other environmental groups, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California ordered the Secretary of Commerce
to embargo tuna products from Mexico. 65 The court conditioned
this embargo on the finding that Mexico's incidental dolphin takes
were not comparable to the United States as defined under the
Act.6
Within two weeks of the court order, the Fisheries Service
lifted the embargo. Although initial Fisheries Service findings
indicated that Mexico exceeded comparability standards, thereby
violating the Act, the Fisheries Service permitted Mexico, under a
Fisheries Service regulation, to submit new data for
reconsideration.67 Based on six months of Mexican fleet
performance statistics, the Fisheries Service found that during the
first six months of 1990 Mexico met the requirements of the

64. EarthIsland,supra note 20. The action was initiated by Earth Island Institute, a California
nonprofit corporation, the Marine Mammal Fund, a California nonprofit corporation, and David R.
Brower.

65.

746 F. Supp. at 969.

66.

Id. See 55 Fed. Reg. 11,921 (1990) (providing the statutory criteria); supra note 47 and

accompanying text (describing the comparability argument).
67. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e)(5)(viii); 55 Fed. Reg. 11,929 (1990) (If a foreign nation has
exceeded the limitations for a given year, and therefore remains under the embargo, the Secretary
may nevertheless reconsider the embargo and certify compliance with the statute's provision based

upon data for only the ast six months following the year the limits were exceeded).
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comparability test. 68 Based on this finding, the Fisheries Service
allowed Mexico to resume exporting its tuna product to the U.S. 69
Earth Island moved for a temporary restraining order to
embargo all tuna exports from Mexico, alleging that the Fisheries
Service violated the Court's order. The Fisheries Service analyzed
Mexico's dolphin mortality data based on less than a full fishing
season. The Court found that the Fisheries Service clearly violated
the MMPA provision which requires the determination of the
percentage of dolphin taken to be based upon data for an entire
season.7" Thus, the Court granted the temporary restraining order
forbidding Mexico from exporting tuna and tuna products to the
United States until Mexico provided a full year of evidence
71
supporting its compliance with the MMPA.
The Earth Island decision illustrates the Fisheries Service's
ineptitude for enforcing the MMPA's provisions. 72 The Act
expressly requires dolphin mortality findings to be based upon data
for an entire fishing season.73 By implementing the
reconsideration regulation that permits the use of data for less than
an entire season to determine comparability, the Fisheries Service

68. 746 F. Supp. at 970-72, aft'd, 929 F.2d at 1451. Ten days after the court order, the
Fisheries Service found that for the first eight months of 1990, Mexico's incidental dolphin taking
rate was 1.58 times that of United States vessels for the same period, which was below the 2.0 times
standard. The Fisheries Service also found that eastern spinner dolphins comprised 10.3% of the total
number of dolphins taken by Mexican vessels. This is less than the 15% standard set by the MMPA.
The court noted that the speed of the Fisheries Service's findings raise serious concerns. In previous
hearings the Fisheries Service claimed that the complexity of the calculations justify an eight month
delay in making findings regarding the importing countries. But now the Fisheries Service can issue
findings in two weeks. Id at 972-73.
69. Id
70. 746F.Supp.at971,affrd,929F.2dat 1452. MMPAsupra note 2, § 1371(a)(2)(B)(i)(Hl)
(An embargo is required unless the total number of eastern spinner dolphin incidentally taken during
the 1989 and subsequent fishing seasons does not exceed 15% of the total number of marine
mammals incidentally taken by such vessels in such year). See MMPA Amendments, supra note 5,
at 6 (referring to the annual quota of dolphins killed).
71. 746 F. Supp. at 969.
72. 929 F.2d at 1453. The court noted the Fisheries Service's record of nonenforcement of
congressional directives during the years which preceded the 1988 amendments. In enacting those
amendments, Congress expressed its concern that the Fisheries Service was not holding foreign
vessels to U.S. standards. Id. See 134 CONG. REc. S16,345 (statement of Sen. Kerry) ("[Ujntil
recently the [Fisheries Service] had not issued or even drafted for that matter, regulations putting in
place many necessary and important changes.").
73. MMPA, supra note 2, § 1371(a)(2)(b)(ii)(H).
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relaxed the enforcement standards. 74 As a result of the Fisheries
Service's action discussed in EarthIsland,Mexico, which exceeded
MMPA standards for an entire year, was not embargoed.75

Moreover, under the Fisheries Service's reconsideration
regulations foreign nations may continually exceed MMPA limits
76
for six months of each year, yet never be subject to an embargo.
Furthermore, this case indicates the Fisheries Service's willingness
to accept a foreign government's data concerning comparability
77
without making an independent finding as mandated by the Act.
Thus, the Fisheries Service's reconsideration regulation creates a
potential for abuse78 and results in the circumvention of
Congressional intent.

B. InaccurateAdministrative Interpretationsof the Act
The MMPA is ineffective internationally because of erroneous
administrative interpretations by the Fisheries Service. Two

74. Telephone interview with Joshua R. Floum, in San Francisco, attorney for the plaintiffsappellees in EarthIsland(Jan. 12,1991). See Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment
at 11-12, EarthIsland, supra note 20 ("Mhe [Fisheries Service] has actually relaxed its standards
in many cases.").
75. 929 F.2d at 1452.
76. 1, at 1452-53.
77. Id at 1451 ("It is difficult to understand how the government could issue a favorable
determination in this case in less than two weeks when it had previously argued that it needed at least
six months to collect and analyze data from foreign nations."); Court Order at 5 n.2, Earth Island,
supra note 20 (In the court order enjoining the Fisheries Service from allowing the importation of
tuna from Mexico, the court speaks with cynicism about the Fisheries Service's findings. "The speed
of the [Fisheries Service's] determination raises serious concerns. At the August hearing in this case,
the defendants argued at length that the complexity of the calculations required by the statute justified
the eight month delay in making findings concerning the importing countries. Now the [Fisheries
Service] is somehow able to issue findings on September 7, 1990 regarding the taking rates for both
Mexico and the United States for the first eight months of 1990. These calculations were made in
approximately two weeks. The federal defendants argue that the earlier delay was due to the fact that
data for the 1989 season was not due from importing countries until the end of July 1990, at which
time [the Fisheries Service] began to make its calculations. [The Fisheries Service] argued that this
procedure allowed them to make more complete calculations by including the data from fishing
vessels which left port at the end of 1990, but which did not return until sometime well into the 1990
fishing season. While the existence of radios raises questions as to why the defendants had to wait
until the fishing vessels returned to port to get data concerning the dolphin kills, the fact that a
similar delay was not required for the calculations at issue in the instant application for TRO only
underscores the Court's concern.").
78. 929 F.2d at 1453.
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examples illustrate the Fisheries Service's actions that limit the
MMPA's usefulness on the international level. For example, on
December 15, 1988, the Fisheries Service embargoed tuna from a
vessel believed to be Spanish.79 The vessel failed to submit, in a
timely manner, the necessary documentation on marine mammal
mortality rates." Consequently, the Fisheries Service denied Spain
exportation rights for over two months.
However, on February 24, 1989, the Fisheries Service rescinded
the ban on tuna importation from the allegedly Spanish vessel.81
This change in policy resulted from the Fisheries Service's
improper assumption that the vessel originally denied exportation
rights was Spanish.82 Actually, the vessel was certified as
Ecuadorian for MMPA purposes. Ecuador was, at that time, in
conformity with the Act. 3 Thus, Spain was improperly
embargoed." This faulty assumption by the Fisheries Service is
an example of inaccurate findings which confuse and frustrate
foreign fleets attempting to comply with MMPA provisions. 5
Another example of inconsistent enforcement of the Act is
evidenced by the Fisheries Service's 1989 statement that Ecuador
conformed with the Act.86 This statement permitted Ecuador to
export tuna into the U.S. while a previous finding of

79.

53 Fed. Reg. 50,420 (1989).

80.
81.

Id
54 Fed. Reg. 7933 (1989).

82.

Id.

83.

Id (The vessel was covered by an agreement between Ecuador and Spain. Furthermore,

Ecuador had a marine mammal finding of conformity).
84. Id Spain must no longer meet the requirements of an Eastern Tropical Pacific harvesting
nation to have its tuna imported into the United States. Id.

85. Inter-Am. Tropical Tuna Comm'n, Report at the Tuna-Dolphin Workshop in San Jos6,
Costa Rica 8-9 (Mar. 14-16, 1989) (available from Scripps Institute of Oceanography, in La Jolla,
California) ("As the U.S. fleet rates may change considerably from year to year, the captains of nonU.S. boats do not have clear goals to aim at. Being told that their performance must fall below a
certain rate allows the captains to know how well they are doing and to strive to reach those goals.
At the same time, goals that are too stringent may discourage them and lead them to give up. Dr.
Hall said he believed that realistic goals would help to motivate the captains, and that more stringent
goals could be set when the current ones were reached.").
86. 54 Fed. Reg. 7933 (1989). "The Republic of Ecuador currently has a marine mammal
finding of conformance." Id.
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nonconformance was still in effect. 7 The Fisheries Service made
an official finding of conformity months later; only then did
Ecuador conform with the Act while exporting tuna into the
U.S."8 Thus, for months the Fisheries Service misapplied a
provision of the Act by allowing Ecuador to export tuna into the
U.S. in violation of the Act.
These two examples are evidence of the Fisheries Service's
inaccurate enforcement of the Act. The Fisheries Service confuses
and misapplies the provisions of the Act. As illustrated above, the
Fisheries Service's enforcement of the Act is either too relaxed or
too stringent. If countries are not properly advised of violations of
the Act, they cannot change their practices accordingly to reduce
dolphin mortality. In addition, incorrect sanctions decrease the
incentive to comply with the Act.
C. Insufficient Observer Coverage
1. Current Observer Coverage
In addition to the Fisheries Service's ineffective enforcement
and misapplication of the Act's provisions, the MMPA contains a
major substantive shortcoming: insufficient observer coverage on
the foreign fleets. Currently, the Fisheries Service accepts a 33%
observer coverage rate, requiring 33% of the foreign vessels to
carry a Tuna Commission observer on board to monitor fishing
practices.89 Underlying the Fisheries Service's designation of an
acceptable observer coverage rate is the assumption that the
unobserved mortality rate, the estimated number of dolphins killed

87.

53 Fed. Reg. 39,743 (1988) (Ecuador had not submitted the required documentation

relating to marine mammal mortality in their fishery).
88. 53 Fed. Reg. 39,744 (1988). "Inorder for yellowfin tuna from any of these nations to be

allowed into the United States, a notice must be published in the Federal Register announcing that
the Assistant Administrator for Fisheries has determined that the nation [conforms with the Act]."
Id.
89. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,919 (1989) (The Fisheries Service accepted 33% observer coverage for
1989 because that level produces a mortality rate estimate with a coefficient of variation similar to
that of the U.S. dolphin mortality rate. A 50% observer coverage is required for Ecuador, Panama,
and Vanuatu which have fleets of five to nine vessels).
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on an unobserved vessel, is the same as the mortality rate from an
observed vessel.' Thus, according to the Fisheries Service, a 33%
observer coverage rate accurately reflects the total dolphin
mortality rate.
However, the kill data from vessels with and without observers
is inconsistent. 9 Periods of a low percentage of observed vessels
tend to have higher dolphin mortality rates than periods with a high
percentage of observed vessels. 2 For example, in 1987, the first
year the domestic fleet had almost complete observer coverage, the
U.S. dolphin mortality rate dropped 30% from the previous year.93
This decline is a result of the "observer effect," '94 which posits
that observed vessels have fewer mortalities than unobserved
95
vessels.
In order to verify the accuracy of the data collected, the
Fisheries Service extended its observer coverage of the U.S. fleets
from 50% in 1986 to 100% in 1987.96 The Fisheries Service
reduced observer coverage back to 50% in 1988. 97 In the 1988
MMPA amendments, Congress required 100% observer coverage
for U.S. fleets during the 1989 season and all subsequent fishing
seasons. 98 Hence, Congress determined that 100% observer

90. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,919 (1989) ("There is concern that the mortality on observed vessels is
less than that on unobserved vessels.").
91. MMPA Reauthorization,supra note 52, at 22 (1988) (questions submitted to NOAA by
Sen. Kerry) ("In 1987, the dolphin mortality resulting from U.S. fleet operations dropped by about
30% from the level of the previous year. In addition, this was the first year in which the U.S. fleet
had almost complete observer coverage.... Is the drop in mortality with increased observer coverage
a coincidence, or an illustration of the need for more observers?").
92. Id
93. Id.
94. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,919 (1989). See C. Denisoff, A Policy Analysis of the Tuna-Dolphin
Conflict in the Eastern Tropical Pacific 16 (Oct. 1988) (copy on file in the office of The
TransnationalLawyer) ("The 'observer effect' argues that captains don't perform as well during
unobserved trips.").
95. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,919 (1989) (The observer effect has not been proven). The observer effect
is a reasonable supposition. On observed vessels the fishermen have an incentive to kill as few
dolphin as possible. The fewer they kill the greater the chance that they will be able to continue to
export their tuna to the U.S. On unobserved vessels the incentive to not kill dolphins is absent. The
number of tuna caught is the object and the means are relatively insignificant.
96. 54 Fed. Reg. 20,171 (1989).
97. Id.
98. See supra note 37 (noting an exception where an observer is unavailable).
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coverage provides the most reliable information on dolphin
mortality.
Actually, the 1988 amendments required 100% observer
coverage for foreign and domestic vessels." However, the
requirement was qualified: the amendment required 100% observer
coverage unless the Fisheries Service determined that an alternative
program "will provide sufficiently reliable documentary evidence
of the average rate of incidental taking of marine mammals in th[e]
The Fisheries Service determined that the
fishery.""°
international observer program of the Tuna Commission, which
provides 33 % coverage, is an acceptable alternative program under
the 1988 Amendments. 0 ' This decision was made because of
insufficient funds for a 100% observer coverage program on the
foreign fleet."° Currently, however, funds are available for a
100% observer coverage program.'0 3 The Fisheries Service's
willingness to accept 33 % observer coverage further exemplifies its
disinterest in decreasing dolphin mortality. The Fisheries Service
ignored congressional findings that a 100% observer coverage
program, if possible to fund, provides reliable data on dolphin
mortality.
2. Inadequacy of Current Observer Coverage
The 33% observer coverage program is inadequate for the
foreign fleets because of the "observer effect." It is unreasonable
to assume that the dolphin mortality rate on the 67% unobserved
foreign vessels equals the dolphin mortality rate of the observed
vessels. For example, a study presented to the U.S. Congress

99.
100.
101.
102.
financial
addition,

See id.
54 Fed. Reg. 20,172 (1989).
54 Fed. Reg. 20,173 (1989).
54 Fed. Reg. 20,172 (1989) (The Tuna Commission indicated that the logistics and
commitments necessary to achieve 100% coverage in 1989 would not be possible. In
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs agreed that additional

funding would be in the interest of the U.S. toward achieving marine mammal conservation but such
funding could not be made available to the Tuna Commission via the State Department until the
fiscal year 1991).

103.
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provided evidence of unreported high dolphin mortality rates on a
vessel without an observer.' Thus, findings of comparability are
based upon data that does not truly reflect the number of dolphins
actually killed by foreign fleets. To accurately determine total
dolphin mortality rates, the MMPA should mandate observers
aboard all foreign vessels." °5
An inadequate international observer rate coupled with
ineffective enforcement of the Act results in a powerless MMPA
on the international level. The U.S. Congress' intent to substantially
decrease the dolphin mortality rate is frustrated by the foreign
fleet's excessive dolphin mortality rate. However, two amendments
to the MMPA could appreciably improve the foreign regulation of
dolphin mortality.
IV. PossmILE AMENDMENTS TO THE MMPA
A. 100% Observer Coverage
The first possible amendment to the MMPA would require
foreign fisheries to maintain a 100% observer program if they wish
to export their tuna and tuna products to the United States.' °6
Both the U.S. Congress and the Fisheries Service recognize the
advantages of such a program."°
Maintaining a 100% observer coverage rate provides several
benefits."0 8 First, the accuracy of the estimates of the mortality
rates improve by reducing the uncertainty caused by the "observer

104. See supra note 37 (noting an exception where an observer is unavailable).
105. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,919 (1989). See L Scheele, Greenpeace International Background Paper
on the Eastern Tropical Pacific Tuna/Dolphin Issue 43 (Apr. 1988) ("The intentional take of marine
mammals by the tuna fishery is not a random event as may be the case with other fisheries. The
operator is in control as to where, when, how, and on which species a set is made. Therefore,
observer coverage... at less than 100 percent cannot ensure reliable mortality statistics.").
106. The 100% observer coverage rate should apply to all nations which have tuna purse seine
vessels of 400 tons carrying capacity or greater operating in the Eastern Tropical Pacific.
107. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,919 (1989) ("Although observer coverage of 33% and 50% are
statistically acceptable to determine comparability of average mortality rates, there are several benefits
from 100% coverage that make a higher level of coverage more desirable.").
108. Id.
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effect."
Accurate dolphin mortality rates are essential in
reducing the number of dolphins killed. Second, the 100% observer
level provides the most accurate basis for determining whether
specific species limitations mandated by the MMPA are
followed." ° Third, a 100% observer program provides a greater
quantity of data for foreign governments and industry to help
implement their vessel operator performance system and
enforcement programs as required under the 1988 amendments."'
Moreover, Congress never intended the 33 % observer coverage
program to be permanent for the foreign fleets.12 Rather,
Congress intended the 33 % observer coverage plan to be temporary
until arrangements could be made to expand the provisions of the
Act." 3 The time to expand observer coverage has arrived. In the
past, the primary reason for not implementing a 100% foreign
observer program was lack of funding."' The Tuna Commission
estimates that an additional $1.23 million will be necessary to
implement a 100% observer program." 5 Because funding is
feasible, a 100% observer coverage program must be implemented
on the foreign fleets.
Several options are available for funding a 100% observer
program." 6 Currently, the Tuna Commission funds the observer

109. Id.
110. Id. ("Observer coverage at the 100% level also provides the most accurate basis to
determine whether or not no more than 15% eastern spinner or no more than 2% of coastal spotted
dolphin are taken annually as required by the MMPA.").
111. Id.
112. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,920 (1989) ("The proposed determination to accept an alternative foreign
observer program will extend to the end of 1990 or to such earlier time as arrangements can be made
to expand the level of observer coverage.").
113. Id.
114. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,919 (1989) (The Fisheries Service explains that -[a] 100 percent foreign

observer program will require time to implement and resources that are not presently available.").
The Tuna Commission also estimated that it would take about eight months to develop the program
and recruit, train and place the observers. l See 54 Fed. Reg. 51,920 (1989) ("In the absence of
institutional arrangements to expand the foreign observer program at this time, [the Fisheries Service]
is proposing to accept an alternative foreign observer program with less than 100 percent observer
coverage while continuing to pursue an institutional arrangement which will provide for an expanded

program.").
115.
116.
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Background Paper, supra note 23, at BPI-90B/10.
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program principally from contributions of its member
countries.117 The United States contributes approximately 90% of
the Tuna Commission's total budget. 1 ' Thus, one funding option
is to increase the contributions of the other member countries.1 19

By budgeting an increase in contributions the member countries
share in the expenses of a 100% observer coverage program.
A second option is to require all governments whose vessels
participate in the Tuna Commission's observer program to share in
the cost of the expansion. 2 ' Many countries participate in the
program but few are actually members of the program. Currently,
only the United States and Panama contribute to the observer plan,
although Mexico, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Vanuatu form the
majority of the international fleet.1'2 Because all the nations that
participate in the program recognize a need to protect dolphins,
they should be willing to contribute to the funding of a program
designed to protect the dolphin."2 On the other hand, less
developed nations may be unable to bear the expense of the high
23
ecological standards of protecting dolphins.
The third, and perhaps best, option to fund a 100% observation
program is to request fimancing from the tuna industry.'2 4 This
option would pass the costs of financing the program on to the tuna
consumers of the United States. Studies indicate that American

117.

Id. Member countries include the U.S., France, and Japan. "The contribution of each is

based upon the proportion of the catch of tunas in the eastern Pacific Ocean which is utilized by that
nation." Id at BPI-90B/9-10.
118. Id. France contributes 5%, Japan 4% and other members 1%of the total budget. Id. at
BPI-90B/10.

119. Id. Increasing the contributions of the member countries may cause a problem because the
typical budgetary process requires that the budgets be submitted two years in advance. However, an

emergency funding program could be set up. Id.
120. & "'Currently vessels flying the flags of Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, the United States,
Vanuatu, and Venezuela participate in the program." Id
121. Background Paper, supra note 23, at BPI-90B/10. "'The fleets of non-member nations
currently share in the cost of the program, however, because they defray the scientific technicians'
living expenses aboard the vessels; this amounts to between I and 2 thousand dollars per trip." Id.
122. See supra note 62 (noting foreign countries' recognition of the need to reduce dolphin

mortality).
123. 55 Fed. Reg. 11,923 (1990).
124. Background Paper, supranote 23, at BPI-90B/10. "Many components of the industry have
expressed interest in supporting the program. If this alternative were pursued, the IAITC would need
to establish clear policies and rules governing the establishment and operation of the program." Id
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consumers are more than 1 willing to pay more for an
environmentally safe product. 25
Thus, funds for a 100% observer coverage program are
available. Tuna consumers of the U.S. can bear the expense of
increasing the percentage of observer coverage. The program must
be implemented before the international fleets kill more dolphins.
B. A New Enforcement Agency
The second possible Amendment to the MMPA would create
a new enforcement organization. Evidence of the Fisheries
Service's weak enforcement and misapplication of the Act's
provisions illustrate the necessity of creating a new enforcement
agency. The District Court in Earth Island expressed its concern
regarding the quality of the Fisheries Service's enforcement of the
Act.1 26 Congress also intimated dissatisfaction with the work of
the Fisheries Service in implementing recent provisions. 1 27 Thus,
as a result of the Fisheries Service's substandard enforcement of
the Act, judicial intervention is necessary to ensure that the
provisions of the Act are carried out in the manner intended by
Congress. A nongovernmental enforcement agency could
effectively execute the Act's provisions.
The new organization would consist of members of
environmental groups from those nations regulated by the Act and

125. Trendwatch, Playing it Dolphin Safe. Starkist Seafood and Other Tuna Companies
Respond to EnvironmentalPressure,9 FOOD & BEvERAGE MARKETING 10 (June 1990) (Lexis, Nexis
library, Foodbv file) ("New York research firm Find/SVP estimates the current total of

"environmentally-responsible' shoppers to consist of between 14 and 19 million households, or 15%
to 20% of the population, and forecasts a rise to almost 22 million households by the end of this
year. By 1995, Find/SVP predicts 52% of all U.S. households will fit this definition. 'This broadbased population comprises a group of consumers who show an increasing willingness to pay a
premium for environmentally-friendly products,' according to the Find/SVP report."). See MMPA
Hearings, supra note 1,at 5 (statement of Rep. Boxer) ("The public would be willing to pay a higher
price for tuna than see the tuna industry continue killing porpoises in their nets."). See also Manning,
supra note 24 (stating that the U.S. consumes about 40% of the world's canned tuna and that
dolphin-safe tuna will probably only cost a few extra cents per can).
126. 746 F. Supp. at 968-971 (The court noted the Fisheries Service's lax record of
promulgating and enforcing standards for foreign fleets).
127. See supra note 72 (indicating concern by Congress in the process of enacting the 1988
MMPA amendments).
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involved in the Tuna Commission's observer program. 128 Political
neutrality and a true concern for dolphins warrant environmental
groups enforcing the Act. This agency would administer the
provisions of the Act guided by the goal of reducing the incidental
killing and injuring of dolphin to insignificant levels. Although the
membership of the enforcement agency would be international, the
United States would retain jurisdiction over the agency, and the
MMPA would govern its actions.12 9 Funding for the organization
would be provided from funds previously used by the Fisheries
Service under the Act. 30
The MMPA was enacted partly in response to the public's
concern for the health and welfare of marine mammals. 3 1 A
politically neutral enforcement agency with environmental interests
will effectively preserve dolphin without the bureaucratic
inefficiencies encountered by the Fisheries Service. Unlike the
Fisheries Service, the proposed enforcement agency will not
accommodate political interests. Thus, since the agency's sole
concern is to preserve the dolphin, foreign fleets would not be
given any latitude in the determination of comparability.
In sum, the proposed amendments to the Act, a 100% observer
coverage program and a new enforcement agency, will increase the
effectiveness of the MMPA on the international level. As with the
domestic fleets, the foreign fleets utilize the United States market
and thus are susceptible to the regulations of that market. 132 Since
the domestic fleets are subject to a 100% observer coverage
program, so must the foreign fleets. The foreign fleet's large

128. See supra note 120 (listing participating countries).
129. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1379 (discussing funding and transfer of authority under the
Act).
130. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1379 (1).
131. 134 CONo. REC. S 16,344 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
132. 55 Fed. Reg. 11,922 (1990). The use of import bans on tuna is an effective way for the
U.S. to influence other harvesting nations to protect dolphin in their purse seine fishing operations.
Id See Inter-Am. Tropical Tuna Comm'n, supra note 85, at 7 (stating that GATT is not being

violated because U.S. fleets are also affected by the legislation). See also L.A. Ties, Nov. 17, 1990,
§ D, at 1, coL 2 (discussing the Court's overturning of the ban on importing Mexican yellowfin tuna,
"both [Mexican and American] commerce secretaries carefully avoided saying that the tuna embargo
could cause problems in the upcoming free trade talks between the two countries. However, Mexican
officials and fishermen clearly considered the embargo an irritant.").
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number of dolphin mortality directly contravenes the provisions of
the Act. A 100% observer program would ensure that foreign fleets
are taking only an acceptable number of dolphin and using the
safest practicable fishing techniques if they wish to export their
133
catch to the U.S.
A new enforcement agency will give the strength to the MMPA
that Congress had initially intended. The new enforcement agency
would further the purpose of the Act by accurately applying
enforcement techniques, such as the comparability test, as Congress
intended. The original Act and the subsequent amendments specify
exactly what needs to be done to export tuna into the U.S., and
there is a greater likelihood that the new organization will execute
those provisions as intended.
C. Domestic Regulation Versus InternationalRegulation
U.S. unilateral actions to protect dolphin are extremely
successful.'3' The possible amendments increase the effectiveness
of the iMPA. Most importantly, the dolphin mortality problem is
presently attacked by U.S. actions. Despite the U.S. success, the
Tuna Commission is working on an international dolphin program
claiming that unilateral action has several weaknesses. 135 The
major weakness of unilateral action is that vessel owners may be
able to successfully market their fish outside the U.S. 136 Thus, the
U.S. will lose control over the foreign vessels' fishing practices.

133. Background Paper, supranote 23, at 2 ("Probably the best way to ensure that no [fishing
nets are] set on dolphin-associated fish would be to have an observer aboard during every trip of
every large purse-seine vessel fishing for tunas in the eastern Pacific Ocean.").
134. 134 CONG. REC. S16,336, S16,345 (1988).
135. Background Paper, supra note 23, at 2. "[S]hipments to markets outside the United States
have increased.. .If the vessel owners are able to market their fish successfully outside the United
States, the initiative of the U.S. canners and the MMPA import restrictions would not only fail to
reduce dolphin mortality, but could conversely increase it... .[D]olphin mortality can be reduced
significantly from its current level, and possibly to "insignificant levels' or levels 'approaching zero.'
This cannot be achieved through unilateral action by a single government or enterprise, but only

through international cooperation among all nations whose vessels fish for tunas associated with
dolphin in the eastern Pacific." Id.
136. Id.
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This thwarts U.S. efforts to substantially decrease dolphin
137
mortality.
An international program, on the other hand, may be more
effective than the MMPA in reducing dolphin mortality from its
current level to insignificant levels. 13 Currently, however,
international agreements which effectively regulate dolphin
mortality in the Eastern Tropical Pacific are nonexistent. The U.S.
Congress reacted to dolphin mortality in the international arena by
enacting the MMPA and utilizing access to the powerful U.S. tuna
market to underpin its regulations. 139 Embargoes prohibiting
foreign vessels from exporting tuna to the U.S. would provide
foreign vessels with a strong incentive to abide by the MMPA.
Thus, these possible amendments to the MMPA would effectively
regulate dolphin mortality until an international program is enacted.
V. CONCLUSION

The MMPA significantly bolstered efforts to preserve dolphins.
Since the Act's inception in 1972 the number of dolphins killed
annually by U.S. fishermen dropped from 370,000 to less than
20,000.'" The most dangerous, yet effective, fishing techniques
141
have been abandoned.

137. 55 Fed. Reg. 11,921 (1990). However, this result is unlikely under the 1988 MMPA
Amendments which require an intermediary nation, which wants yellowfin tuna imported into the
U.S., to ban the importation of yellowfi tuna from any nation that is prohibited from exporting
directly to the U.S. Id.
138. Background Paper,supranote 23, at 2 ("[D]olphin mortality can be reduced significantly
from its current level, and possibly to insignificant levels or levels approaching zero. This cannot be
achieved through unilateral action by a single government or enterprise, but only through international
cooperation among all nations whose vessels fish for tunas associated with dolphins in the eastern
Pacific."). See C. Denisoff, supra note 94, at 60 (Fishery biologists, economists, and environmental
and fleet representatives all agree on the need for an international management approach).
139. D. KING & H. BATEmAN, TmE ECONOMIC IMPACr oF RECENT CHANGES IN TE U.S.
TUNA INDUsTRY 2 (California Sea Grant College Working Paper No. P-T-47, 1985) (A small decline
in U.S. tuna consumption, from a consumer boycott, could dump enough extra tuna onto the world
market to create disruptions in all national tuna markets, and could result in idle capacity in fish
harvesting and processing in many regional tuna industries).
140. 134 CONG. REC. S16,336, S16,345 (1988).
141. See MMPA Hearings, supra note 1, at 27 (Seal bombs, which explode and injure dolphin,
and sundown sets, fishing at sundown so that the dolphin cannot be untangled from the nets, have
been discontinued despite their effectiveness).
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However, the MMPA is relatively ineffective in regulating
foreign fleets. Since the MMPA's enactment seventeen years ago,
the number of dolphins killed annually by foreign fishermen
increased from 20,000 to 100,000.142
Foreign fleets successfully circumvent the purpose of the
MMPA. Inaccurate data allow foreign fisheries to appear as though
they are comparable to the U.S. fisheries. In reality foreign fleets
violate the comparability provision of the Act. The Fisheries
Service is extremely indulgent in determining whether a foreign
country passes the comparability test. Thus, the purpose of the Act,
to reduce the number of dolphins incidentally killed, is frustrated.
The proposals made herein will further the reduction of dolphin
mortality. A 100% observer coverage rate ensures that foreign
fishing vessels comply with the MWA. The enforcement agency's
decision whether to embargo the tuna products of the foreign
fishery shall be based on data from all tuna fishing vessels and
compiled over the one year fishing season. The observer effect will
no longer cloud the reality of the excessive dolphin mortality rate
by the foreign fleets.
A nongovernmental, neutral enforcement agency will efficiently
implement the provisions of the Act. It will be unnecessary for the
judiciary to police the enforcement of the Act thereby saving time
and money. Congress' intent is clear and without any conflicting
interests, political or ideological, the new agency will be able to
properly execute the Act.
The MMPA illustrates that domestic legislation is effective in
addressing an international problem. The prerequisite to effective
regulation is a large market. Free trade does not necessarily require
a total absence of regulation of the market as long as the
regulations are administered even-handedly with no crippling
effects. The possible amendments would mandate 100% observer
coverage on both domestic and foreign fleets. In addition, an
environmentally conscious enforcement agency will fairly execute
the provisions of the Act for all nations resulting in a significant

142.
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reduction in dolphin mortality. The possible amendments to the
MMPA offer an effective solution to an important international
problem.
Michael T. Parsons
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